FCC - Accelerating Submarine Cable Deployment
An ISOC LIVE Summary
Fact Sheet (draft item, June 4, 2026) Tentatively scheduled for consideration at the FCC’s June 25, 2026 Open Meeting; under consideration and subject to change.
This FCC Fact Sheet describes a draft Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would significantly expand the Commission’s regulatory framework for undersea communications infrastructure while attempting to accelerate deployment timelines for new cable systems. The proceeding builds on the FCC’s 2025 Submarine Cable First Report and Order and reflects growing concern about the strategic importance of subsea connectivity for AI infrastructure, cloud computing, global Internet traffic, and national security.
Strategic Framing: Submarine Cables as Critical Infrastructure
The FCC describes submarine cables as the “most consequential and critical communications infrastructure serving the United States,” emphasizing that they carry the vast majority of global Internet and communications traffic. The document repeatedly links submarine cable infrastructure to artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and geopolitical competition. The Commission aligns the proceeding with Executive Order 14365 on U.S. AI leadership and invokes President Trump’s America First Investment Policy Memorandum (Feb. 21, 2025) — quoting that “investment at all costs is not always in the national interest.”
The order argues that rapid growth in global bandwidth demand and increased reliance on ultra-low-latency connectivity require a recalibration of national security oversight — a position the FCC links to an ex parte filing from Anthropic (filed Jan. 22, 2026). The Commission cites concerns about foreign adversary influence, particularly involving Chinese-linked entities and “Covered List” companies already identified as national security threats under other FCC proceedings.
Creation of a New Regulatory Regime for SLTE
The core innovation of the draft order is the FCC’s finding that it has authority — under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530 — to regulate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) owners and operators. SLTE refers to the equipment that converts optical signals carried by submarine fiber into electrical signals connecting into terrestrial networks. The FCC argues that this equipment effectively controls operation of the cable system itself and therefore falls within the Commission’s authority.
The Commission would establish a new licensing framework that would:
Require SLTE owners and operators to become licensed entities;
Create blanket licenses for current and future SLTE operators not otherwise licensed (excluding those subject to presumptive disqualifying conditions);
Exclude entities associated with foreign adversaries from automatic blanket licensing eligibility;
Impose cybersecurity, reporting, and compliance obligations on SLTE operators.
The FCC argues that technological changes in modern “open cable” architectures now allow independent entities to control capacity on submarine systems through dark fiber leases or IRUs (Indefeasible Rights of Use), often by operating their own SLTE infrastructure. This evolution, according to the FCC, creates new security vulnerabilities requiring direct regulatory oversight.
National Security Measures and Foreign Adversary Restrictions
A major theme throughout the proceeding is the imposition of extensive national security safeguards. The FCC would adopt or propose conditions that would:
Prohibit use of principal equipment produced by foreign adversary-controlled entities;
Restrict relationships with third-party service providers posing national security risks;
Ban certain IRU and capacity lease arrangements involving Covered List entities;
Require reporting of foreign adversary ownership changes;
Mandate cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans;
Require annual reporting — a general Foreign Adversary Annual Report and a tailored SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report from certain operators.
The Commission repeatedly references its broader “foreign adversary” regulatory framework, including recent FCC actions targeting telecommunications certification bodies, test labs, and equipment suppliers associated with China.
Streamlining and Fast-Tracking Cable Applications
Alongside tighter security rules, the FCC proposes mechanisms intended to accelerate cable deployment. The Commission would presumptively exempt applications from Executive Branch national security review where the applicant certifies that a set of national security standards is met.
To qualify for expedited treatment, applicants would need to satisfy multiple conditions, including:
No significant ownership by foreign adversary-linked entities;
No foreign adversary debt or financing relationships;
No interconnection with foreign adversary cable systems;
Strong cybersecurity and physical security controls;
Compliance reporting and audit obligations;
Existing mitigation agreements and demonstrated good standing where applicable.
The FCC presents this “trusted operator” model as a way to both increase investment speed and maintain security oversight.
Expansion of Interagency Coordination
The proceeding also strengthens coordination between the FCC and Executive Branch agencies commonly referred to as “Team Telecom,” including the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security. The order would facilitate expanded information sharing and integrate Executive Branch security review more deeply into FCC submarine cable regulation.
Industry Response and Stakeholder Debate
The Fact Sheet summarizes a mixed response from industry stakeholders. Several telecommunications associations and operators supported efforts to streamline approvals and establish clearer security standards. However, substantial opposition emerged regarding direct licensing of SLTE operators.
Critics argued that:
SLTE licensing may be overly broad;
Existing cable licensees already provide sufficient oversight;
Notification or registration systems could achieve similar goals with lower burden;
Domestic operators and trusted providers should receive exemptions.
Supporters of stronger regulation, including some national security advocates and government agencies, argued that the increasing modularity and disaggregation of cable systems requires more direct oversight of entities controlling terminal equipment and traffic management infrastructure.
Broader Policy Significance
The proceeding represents a major evolution in U.S. telecommunications infrastructure policy. The FCC moves beyond traditional cable landing licensing toward a more comprehensive infrastructure security framework tied to geopolitical competition, AI infrastructure strategy, and supply chain control.
The document reflects several broader policy trends:
Increasing securitization of communications infrastructure;
Expanded FCC focus on foreign adversary risks;
Integration of AI infrastructure priorities into telecom policy;
Greater scrutiny of international ownership and financing structures;
Movement toward “trusted vendor” ecosystems in global communications networks.
The FCC positions the proceeding as balancing two goals: accelerating submarine cable deployment to support AI and cloud growth, while tightening national security controls over the infrastructure underpinning global Internet connectivity.
COMMENTARY
Davis Wright Tremaine — FCC Proposes Expanded Subsea Cable Licensing Authority, Team Telecom Review Exemptions — law-firm analysis framing the draft as an intermediate step, not the endpoint
Greenberg Traurig — FCC Updates to Submarine Cable Landing License Rules — detailed breakdown of the SLTE blanket-license and IRU/lease conditions
Submarine Networks — SLTE Licensing, National Security, US Tech Giants Benefit & Systematic Exclusion of China — industry read on the China-exclusion implications at the SLTE layer
Submarine Telecoms Forum — FCC Announces Tentative Agenda for June 2026 Meeting — trade-press summary of the FNPRM’s open questions on routine conditions
Akin — FCC Announces Tentative Agenda for June 2026 Meeting — concise walkthrough of the five-item agenda and the 10 national security standards
RESOURCES
FCC Fact Sheet — Accelerating Submarine Cable Deployment (Second R&O and Second FNPRM, draft, June 4, 2026) — the primary source document
FCC June 2026 Open Commission Meeting — agenda page for the June 25, 2026 meeting where the item is tentatively scheduled
FCC — Accelerating the Buildout of Submarine Cables — Commission landing page for the draft item (OI 24-523, MD 24-524)
Federal Register — 2025 Submarine Cable First Report and Order and FNPRM — the 2025 proceeding this builds on
FCC 25-49 — 2025 Submarine Cable First Report and Order (full text) — prior order that first proposed the SLTE framework
FCC ECFS — Docket OI 24-523 / MD 24-524 filings — public comment record including ex parte filings